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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Ohio holds all land underlying the waters of Lake Erie and 
navigable rivers, as well as all artificially filled land, in trust for the benefit of the 
people of Ohio.1 Traditionally, private use of trust resources was subject to the 
public rights of navigation, water commerce, and fishing.2 This principle, known as 
the public trust doctrine, exists in every state but takes myriad forms and protects 
                                                            
* J.D. expected, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2014; B.A., John Carroll 
University. Deepest thanks to Professor Carolyn Broering-Jacobs and Jackie Staple for their 
advice and guidance during the research and writing process. The author would also like to 
thank Jacob, Laila, and Juliana for their unending support and encouragement throughout this 
endeavor. Volim te. 
 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2012).  
 2 Lemley v. Stevenson, 661 N.E.2d 237, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
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widely varying uses and interests.3 Many states have clarified their public trust 
doctrines through statutes or judicial review in order to meet the public’s changing 
needs, but Ohio’s public trust doctrine remains nebulous.4 While Ohio’s legislature 
and courts have reviewed the state’s public trust doctrine in other ways, they have 
failed to clearly define how trust land can be used in harmony with the public’s 
inalienable and expanding rights. An overbroad interpretation of Ohio’s doctrine 
may lead to obliteration of the natural shoreline; a narrow interpretation may lead to 
ossification of the valuable resource. The question then becomes this: How can Ohio 
effectively protect the public’s right to the state’s water resources while promoting 
the highest and best use of the valuable shoreline? The needs are not mutually 
exclusive, but must be carefully balanced to avoid over- or under-utilization, to 
protect the environment, and to encourage a robust economy. 
Nowhere in Ohio is the public trust doctrine’s ambiguity more impactful than in 
Cleveland, the state’s second most populous city5 and only major metropolitan area 
located directly on Lake Erie. For decades, Cleveland’s lakefront has been a central 
focus of planners, public officials, civic leaders and average citizens.6 Inspired by 
other waterfront cities’ development projects and their beneficial impact on the 
regional economies, Cleveland’s Mayor Frank Jackson has asked private developers 
for proposals on how to transform some twenty-five acres north of First Energy 
Stadium, the Rock ‘n Roll Hall of Fame, and Burke Lakefront Airport into places for 
the public to live, work, and enjoy.7 A looming problem, however, may put an end to 
Cleveland’s lofty ambitions as many developers and politicians fail to consider the 
public trust doctrine’s effect on the very lands they seek to develop. 
The City seeks to develop artificially filled land that falls within the public trust. 
Although the City of Cleveland received title to the land in 1914 and 1953 via quit 
claim deeds,8 Ohio’s public trust doctrine historically restricted such land use to only 
                                                            
 3 Compare Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 
1995) (holding public trust does not apply to artificially filled land), with State ex rel. Squire 
v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1948) (finding the public trust does apply to 
artificially filled land). 
 4 See Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).  
 5 Population Estimates: Places in Ohio Listed Alphabetically, US CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/cities/totals/2011/tables/SUB-EST2011-03-39.xls (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2012). 
 6 See generally Dennis Keating et al., Cleveland’s Lakefront: Its Development and 
Planning, 4 J. PLANNING HISTORY 129 (2005). 
 7 See generally Cleveland’s Downtown Lakefront Plan, THE CITY OF CLEVELAND 
PLANNING COMM’N (Apr. 2012), http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us/lakefront/may2012/
april2012CPCpresentation.pdf; Seeking a Private Stake in Cleveland's Lakefront: Editorial, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/
2012/09/seeking_a_private_stake_in_cle.html; Cleveland Asks Prospective Lakefront 
Developers to Start Lining Up, IDEASTREAM.COM (June 3, 2013), http://www.ideastream.org/
news/feature/54072. 
 8 Deed from The State of Ohio to The City of Cleveland (recorded July 17, 1914) (on file 
with author); Deed from The New York Central Railroad Company to The City of Cleveland 
(recorded on Oct. 21, 1953) (on file with author). 
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navigation, water commerce, and fishing. More recently, the legislature broadened 
the scope of permitted land use to “public uses” but failed to define the scope of this 
category. The following problem remains: if the City uses the land contrary to the 
public trust, the State of Ohio could attempt to void the land grant, preventing the 
City from pursuing development plans essential to the region’s economic 
development. On the other hand, if the expanded public use requirement is 
interpreted too broadly, it could allow for unfettered development and the 
privatization of Lake Erie’s shoreline.  
While this Note specifically focuses on Cleveland and Lake Erie’s shoreline, the 
public trust doctrine directly affects all Ohio waterfront communities. With many 
states expanding public trust use restrictions to non-navigable water and smaller 
tributaries, the doctrine may potentially affect every municipality containing a water 
resource.9 Consequently, clarifying this doctrine becomes an essential state-wide 
issue. Though numerous legal scholars have discussed the public trust in relation to 
the nation’s water resources, few have specifically addressed how the public trust 
governs the use of trust property that has been created by filling in submerged land.10  
This Note will first provide a brief overview of the historical public trust doctrine 
as derived from Roman and English law and will outline the development of Ohio’s 
public trust doctrine by focusing on how the doctrine governs filled land. Next, this 
Note will discuss different states’ adaptations of the doctrine and will compare them 
to Ohio’s public purpose requirement. Finally, this Note will propose a solution for 
clarifying Ohio’s public trust doctrine that will enable land development while 
protecting the state’s valuable waterfront for the benefit of the public. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Overview of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine has ancient roots.11 The doctrine originated in Roman 
legal concepts of common property.12 It then evolved under English common law, 
where the sovereign held the navigable waterways and submerged lands “as trustee 
                                                            
 9 See Danielle Spiegel, Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Western Groundwater?, 18 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 412, 413 (2010) (finding advocates for expansion of the public trust 
beyond navigable waters to groundwater); Janice Holmes, Following the Crowd: The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota Expands the Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine to Non-Navigable, 
Non-Meandered Bodies of Water in Parks v. Cooper, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1317, 1318 
(2005) (finding South Dakota has expanded the public trust doctrine to non-meandered, non-
navigable lakes); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (expanding 
public trust doctrine to non-navigable wetlands lying several miles north of the Mississippi 
coast). 
 10 See, e.g., Bertram C. Frey & Andrew Mutz, The Public Trust in Surface Waterways and 
Submerged Lands of the Great Lakes States, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 907, 954 (2007); 
Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 471-566 (1970). 
 11 Kilbert, supra note 4, at 3. 
 12 J. INST. 2.1.1. 
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of a public trust for the benefit of the people” for uses such as navigation, water 
commerce and fishing.13  
Roman and English law divided all property interests in land underlying 
navigable waterways into both private and public titles. These titles have been 
termed jus privatum and jus publicum, respectively.14 Private title could be 
transferred to a private party; however, the government always retained the public 
title and continued to hold the land in trust for the people for navigation, commerce 
and fishing.15 “[Land] ownership is often referred to in legal philosophy as a bundle 
of sticks or rights, and one or more of the sticks may be separated from the bundle 
and the bundle will still be considered ownership.”16 The private and public titles 
that apply to public trust land are like individual sticks and can be separated—the 
private title stick is held by the landowner while the public title stick remains held by 
the state in perpetuity. In this way, ownership is vested in the landowner while the 
state maintains its public rights.17 
Public rights have historically burdened privately owned public trust property. 
Public rights in England, for example, attached to riverbanks and seashores, which 
were essential for use in fishing and navigation even if they were privately owned.18 
Consequently, the King could demolish or seize any structure which encroached or 
intruded upon the trust land and impeded the public’s rights.19 In this way, the 
private landowner’s rights were subordinate to the public rights to use trust land 
because the government retained its trust obligation for the people.20 But this trust 
was not absolute. The law recognized that public rights were not indestructible, often 
eliminating public rights by granting exclusive rights, or individual ownership, in 
                                                            
 13 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (“By the common law, both the title and the 
dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of 
all the lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England, are in 
the king. Such waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the 
tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and 
their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation and 
commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the king's subjects. 
Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to 
the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the 
representative of the nation and for the public benefit.”). 
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Air Flite & Serv-A-Plane v. Tittabawassee Twp., 350 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 17 See id.  
 18 Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept with Modern 
Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 852 (1982). 
 19 State v. Cleveland-Pittsburgh Ry., 25 Ohio C.D. 630, 637 (Ohio Ct. App. 1914). 
 20 Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Mich. 2005) (“Therefore the title, jus privatum, 
in such lands . . . belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus 
publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.” 
(quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894))). 
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communal property or modifying the public rights for some “legitimate public 
purpose.”21  
The United States adopted the English doctrine, and each new state entering the 
Union received title to the lands underlying the navigable and tidal waters within its 
boundaries.22 Since the early days of the Union, the United States recognized these 
land interests as the public trust doctrine.23 Most notably, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, which has 
come to be known as “the lodestar in American public trust law.”24 The Court found 
that a state’s title to tide and submerged lands differs from the title to other land.25 
As the Court explained, a public trust title “is a title held in trust for the people of the 
State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have the liberty of fishing,” free from interference by the state or private 
parties.26 The Illinois Court did not, however, hold that public rights could never be 
alienated from trust land under any circumstances. The Court explained that the 
legislature could expressly alienate property free of the public trust when the grant 
“promot[es] the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”27  
In Illinois, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a grant from the Illinois 
legislature conveying approximately one thousand acres of submerged lands, 
encompassing virtually the entire commercial waterfront of Chicago, to the Illinois 
Central Railroad because the transfer violated the public trust doctrine.28 Four years 
later, the legislature repealed the exclusive grant, and the state sought a judicial 
declaration confirming its title to the submerged bed of Lake Michigan and its 
exclusive right to develop Chicago harbor. Finding Chicago harbor to be immensely 
valuable to the citizens of Illinois, the Court determined that the legislature lacked 
the power to convey the submerged lands to private individuals and concluded that, 
as a result of the state’s sovereign obligation, the legislative grant to Illinois Central 
was necessarily revocable.29 
                                                            
 21 Sax, supra note 10; Butler, supra note 18. 
 22 Shively, 152 U.S. at 26 (explaining that the United States acquired title and under the 
equal footing doctrine). 
 23 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 1, 
(recognizing the public trust doctrine); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (same); Martin v. 
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (same). 
 24 Sax, supra note 10, at 489; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; Douglas L. 
Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central Railroad, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 885 (2001). 
 25 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 453. 
 28 The fee simple grant gave all rights, title, and interest in the submerged beds of Lake 
Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Id. 
 29 Id. The Illinois Central decision has also received much criticism. See Kilbert, supra 
note 4, at 7 (“[S]ome commentators have criticized the public trust doctrine [and the Illinois 
Central decision], claiming that it is an ill-defined excuse for judges to override the decisions 
of elected legislatures and to trample and take private property rights without due 
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Despite the Illinois decision, each state has interpreted and enforced the public 
trust doctrine independently and distinctly.30 States’ varying interpretations have led 
to the doctrine’s current form: there is “no universal and uniform law upon the 
subject, but each state has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its 
borders according to its own views of justice and policy.”31 Most significantly, 
states’ doctrines vary widely in the breadth of protected public uses. Some states 
restrict public trust lands to a traditional triad of uses: navigation, water commerce, 
and fishing. For example, Ohio courts historically restricted the use of public trust 
land by interpreting the public trust doctrine to allow only the traditional triad of 
uses.32 In contrast, other states have broadened their doctrines to include recreational 
uses such as swimming, bathing, and pleasure boating.33 Still other states have 
generalized public rights as “other easements allowed by law”34 and “other 
interests.”35 Some states have broadened their doctrines to allow land use for a 
public purpose and have applied varying tests to determine which types of land use 
fulfill this requirement, finding the following to be acceptable: production of oil,36 
                                                            
compensation to the owners, either by restricting the owners' ability to use their property or by 
forcing them to allow the public to use their property.”); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the 
Public Trust Doctrine in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 740 (1996) (“[S]tates should 
view Illinois Central as persuasive, rather than mandatory, authority. . . . [It] relies 
conceptually on a fundamental misreading of the scope of state power . . . [and] the decision is 
ill-reasoned, as demonstrated by the opinion's dependence on inapposite precedent. Illinois 
Central is flawed as well because it lacks a foundation in either the federal Constitution or in 
federal common law.”). However, other courts have also found grants revocable. See Kootenai 
Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (“[T]he 
continuing power of the state as administrator of the public trust . . . extends to the revocation 
of previously granted rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free 
of the trust.”). 
 30 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) (“The foregoing summary of the laws of the 
original States shows that there is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but that each 
State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders according to its own 
views of justice and policy, reserving its own control over such lands, or granting rights 
therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it 
considered for the best interests of the public. Great caution, therefore, is necessary in 
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.”). 
 31 See Lake Front E. 55th St. Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 7 Ohio Supp. 17, ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. 
Comm. Pleas 1939). 
 32 See, e.g., State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916) (holding that a 
property owner’s right in public trust lands is one that can only be exercised in aid of 
navigation and commerce and for “no other purpose”). 
 33 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and States Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 18 (2007). 
 34 Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So.2d 367, 372 (Fla. 2007). 
 35 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:1701 (2007). 
 36 See Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797, 815-16 (Cal. 1928). 
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construction of bridges,37 a YMCA,38 restaurants, bars, driving ranges and a 
shopping complex.39 Such a broad range of uses leads to confusion among and 
within states on how public trust land can and should be used. 
The public trust endows rights upon the public, but it also imposes certain 
responsibilities on the state. The state must protect the public’s right to use those 
waters and underlying lands. In doing so, the public trust doctrine can be employed 
to invalidate or stop both governmental and private actions that violate the 
doctrine.40 Several courts have found that the state can revoke private titles if land 
use is contrary to the public rights and specifically inconsistent with the traditional 
“triad” of uses.41 For example, Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court transformed 
land owners’ fee simple absolute titles in submerged public trust land into revocable 
defeasible fees.42 The court found that, pursuant to the public trust, nineteenth 
century statutes authorizing fills in Boston Harbor for wharfing included an implied 
                                                            
 37 See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967) 
(dictum). 
 38 See People v. City of Long Beach, 338 P.2d 177, 179 (Cal. 1959) (“[O]ther than the 
goodwill that it may engender for itself, the sole benefit it will derive is the ability to promote 
a public trust purpose that happens also to be one of its own. Under these circumstances, the 
public benefit that will result from the Y.M.C.A.’s operation of the facility at its own expense 
is clearly sufficient consideration for the Y.M.C.A.’s use of the building and such incidental 
non-monetary benefits as it may receive.”). 
 39 See Martin v. Smith, 184 Cal. App. 2d 571, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); Richard J. 
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 652-53 (1986).  
 40 Kilbert, supra note 4, at 5. 
 41 See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 
1979); State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 
146 U.S. 387 (1892); Conveying Jus Privatum Title to a Port Authority, Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 
2-284 (2000) (“Because the public's trust rights in the parcel have not been terminated, the 
General Assembly may enact legislation that repeals the conveyance to the port authority of 
the state's jus privatum title to the parcel.”). 
In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme Court invoked the public trust doctrine to 
invalidate a legislative grant of property underlying Lake Michigan. The Court found that 
transferring a vast swath of Lake Michigan beds to a private corporation would render 
virtually the entire Chicago Harbor useless for public navigation. In light of the public trust 
doctrine, the Court found the State of Illinois did not have the authority to alienate the lands in 
a manner that did not preserve the waters for the use of the public. Though the grant had 
transferred the jus privatum title to the railroad, the Court found the State retained the jus 
publicum title in the land, which allowed the Court to revoke the railroad’s grant when its use 
of the land violated the public trust.  
However, in Boston Waterfront, the Supreme Judicial Court struggled with determining an 
appropriate remedy in such a situation. Reclaiming land for violation of the public trust 
“would probably not be appropriate in many cases, particularly given the extensive reliance on 
the grant that is likely to have occurred, the considerable length of time that is likely to have 
passed since the grant, and the potential for characterization as an unconstitutional taking in 
some cases.” Kristen Hoffman, Waterfront Redevelopment as an Urban Revitalization Tool: 
Boston's Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 545 (1999). 
 42 Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 367 (Mass. 1979). 
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condition subsequent that required the lands to be used for the public purpose of 
maritime commerce. Thus, the lands were subject to forfeiture if converted to private 
condominiums.43 Likewise, Ohio courts have found private titles burdened with 
public trust limitations, finding “[u]nless the fee be expressly authorized to be taken, 
the interest taken will be limited by the public necessity. . . . Where lands are 
acquired for a public use, an easement only is taken.”44 As a remedy to non-
permitted use, “[t]he State of Ohio by appropriate action may restore to navigation 
any property that may have been developed for other uses.”45 
The uncertainty in Ohio’s public trust doctrine is most appreciable in Cleveland, 
Ohio.46 The State of Ohio granted the City of Cleveland title to large areas of 
artificially filled lands in Lake Erie.47 The legislative grants do not expressly 
extinguish the public trust interest from the land; therefore, courts would likely find 
the state of Ohio only granted the City the private title, retaining the public title in 
trust for the people of Ohio. For that reason, title to the land is vested in the City so 
long as the land is utilized in a manner consistent with uses comporting with the 
public trust doctrine. Should the City use the land for any purpose that infringes on 
the public’s rights or is contrary to the state’s public trust doctrine, the state may 
assert its interest and void the City’s title.48  
                                                            
 43 Id.; see also Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d at 1135 (holding that an attempted conveyance 
of over a mile of Lake Champlain waterfront for real estate development was a violation of 
the public trust doctrine and the state had the right to reclaim title to the lands if they were 
devoted to purposes inconsistent with the public trust doctrine).  
 44 White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 311, 317 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911) 
(holding further, “[w]here lands are acquired for a public use, an easement only is taken 
therein, unless the taking of a greater estate, as a fee simple, is expressly authorized by law.”). 
For an interesting discussion regarding the public trust as an easement, see Butler, supra note 
18, at 843 (“Although many courts classify the right as an easement, the right technically is a 
profit à prendre. Unlike a common right, an easement merely creates a right to use another's 
land in a specified manner and does not confer any right to take the land's natural products. 
Also, whereas an easement creates an exclusive right of use, a common right, by definition, is 
shared by all commoners. A common right is not an estate held in common because the latter 
involves an interest in the land that is shared by more than one party and gives each equal 
possessory rights in the entire tract. Thus, regulation of land held in a concurrent estate would 
be impossible without the consent of all parties. Finally, unlike most other property interests, 
common rights exist regardless of the property owner's intent.”). 
 45 State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 17 Ohio Supp. 137, 165 (Ohio Ct. Comm. 
Pleas 1945). 
 46 Other lakefront cities in Ohio have also been impacted by Ohio’s public trust. See Ohio 
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-047 (2000) (discussing whether a grant to the Toledo Port Authority 
was revocable under Ohio’s public trust doctrine). 
 47 Deed from The State of Ohio to The City of Cleveland (recorded July 27, 1914) (copy 
on file with author); Deed from The New York Central Railroad Company to The City of 
Cleveland (recorded Oct. 21, 1953) (copy on file with author). 
 48 In Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979), the Ohio Appeals 
Court found that a change in land use could void title to the property. A railroad attempted to 
transfer artificially filled land lying within an area of the public trust to a private entity and 
thereby alienate the public of their rights to this property under the trust. The court found that 
so long as the property was used in aid of navigation to benefit the public trust the owner had 
a right to title, but changing the use of the property to permit a diversion of it to private uses 
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The City has announced plans to utilize this filled land as a mixed-use 
commercial development, consisting of an office campus, residential housing, hotel, 
parking, and public recreation facilities.49 In response to the City’s 2013 Request for 
Qualifications, at least five development teams submitted proposals for the site.50 
The teams proposed constructing film studios, schools, restaurants and hotels on the 
site. If the state of Ohio finds that these uses are inconsistent with the state’s public 
trust doctrine, it could cause delays in development, cause years of litigation, and 
result in the state revoking the City’s title. It is imperative, then, to analyze and 
define to what uses public trust land can be put when the public title remains in trust 
with the state of Ohio. 
B. Overview of Ohio’s Public Trust Doctrine 
Each state interprets the public trust doctrine to fit its particular needs and 
circumstances.51 Because much of Ohio’s public trust jurisprudence is the result of 
litigation concerning land on Cleveland’s waterfront, this Note considers Ohio’s 
doctrine through the framework of Cleveland’s developmental history.  
1. Cleveland’s Historical Lakefront Development Plans: The Real Mistake on the 
Lake52 
To understand the public trust doctrine’s impact on Cleveland’s lakefront, it is 
important to consider the area’s developmental history—a history mirrored by many 
other Great Lake waterfront cities. Cleveland was established at the confluence of 
Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River. Its waterfront location contributed to the city’s 
rise as a commercial and industrial center in the Midwest.53 As an epicenter of 
industry, railroads quickly built tracks linking both local areas and metropolitan 
areas such as Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Columbus to growing 
                                                            
different from the object for which the trust was created voided the title. In contrast, Ohio 
courts have found lands within the public trust may be devoted to purposes unrelated to the 
trust without voiding the title if such purposes are incidental to and accommodate trust uses. 
Other courts have similarly found that using trust land adversely to public trust purposes can 
void a private landowner’s title to the land. See Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp., 393 N.E.2d at 
367 (interpreting the public trust doctrine as a condition subsequent; therefore, if a current use 
did not satisfy the public purpose requirement, the state could reclaim title).  
 49 Cleveland’s Downtown Lakefront Plan, THE CITY OF CLEVELAND PLANNING COMM’N 
(Apr. 2012), http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us/lakefront/may2012/april2012CPC
presentation.pdf. 
 50 Michelle Jarboe McFee, Cleveland Lakefront RFQ Documents Reveal Details About 
Potential Projects, Development Teams, CLEVELAND.COM, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.
cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/09/cleveland_lakefront_rfq_docume.html. 
 51 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894). 
 52 In the 1960s, Cleveland was nicknamed “the mistake on the lake” largely because of the 
city’s “growing economic malaise,” pollution, shrinking employment opportunities, declining 
schools, budget crises (the city eventually declared bankruptcy), riots, and increasing crime. 
David Stradling & Richard Stradling, Perceptions of the Burning River: Deindustrialization 
and Cleveland's Cuyahoga River, 13 ENVTL. HISTORY 515, 530 (Jul. 2008). 
 53 See Keating et al., supra note 6, at 129. 
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Cleveland.54 The railroads expanded by filling in portions of Lake Erie, and soon 
much of Cleveland’s lakefront included artificially filled land used for docks, 
businesses, service sheds, heavy industry and warehouses.55  
Early city plans evidence an insensitivity to water resources, focusing instead on 
grand public buildings centered around a public mall.56 A 1903 plan has been 
described as, “designed to impress the public with a built environment, rather than 
enhance a natural lakefront.”57 In the 1930s, significant fill was added to Cleveland’s 
lakefront as part of an effort to create jobs to offset high unemployment rates; 
however, the city failed to utilize this new land to maximize public utility. Several 
development plans were created to capitalize on Cleveland’s waterfront resources 
and restore the lakefront to “what the Maker intended it to be, a source for profit and 
advantage in the commercial development of the city.”58 However, because the 
railroads occupied such vast areas of the lakefront, they “impeded other development 
by acquiring waterfront rights and holding them so that others could not use them.”59 
The railroads’ hold on waterfront property complicated development for decades and 
ultimately contributed to the piecemeal development of the area surrounding 
Cleveland’s lakefront.60 
Even in these early years, residents realized that the industrialization of the 
waterfront was adversely affecting their most valuable resource. John Stockley, one 
of the very first landowners to fill into Lake Erie, later disparaged, “You’re letting 
the railroads ruin the most beautiful thing we have”—the lake.61 In later years, the 
focus of lakefront development plans became transportation, and a limited access 
highway, known as the Shoreway, was completed after World War II.62 This 
roadway connected the east and west sides of town but cut off the lakefront from 
much of the surrounding areas.  
In the decades following the decline of Cleveland’s industrial supremacy, 
Cleveland became notorious as “the mistake on the lake.”63 While the epithet 
                                                            
 54 Id. at 131.  
 55 Id. 
 56 Further insensitivity can be seen in the development of Cleveland’s highways. Id. at 130 
(“As manufacturing operations shifted or were abandoned altogether, many of these sites were 
converted to highway uses as the automobile began to dominate urban transportation after 
World War II[.] Unfortunately, these roadways resulted in numerous cities being severed from 
their water bodies. . . . The highways built at this time reflected an anti-urban attitude as well 
as gross insensitivity to rivers and other water bodies. . . . Pollution of the nation’s waterways 
further exacerbated the image of the waterfront at the time as derelict, abandoned territory.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 57 See id. at 134 (“The plan was designed to impress the public with a built environment, 
rather than enhance a natural lakefront.”). 
 58 Id. at 136 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 59 Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Id. at 130.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Memorial Shoreway, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY, available at http://
ech.cwru.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=MS3. 
 63 Stradling & Stradling, supra note 52, at 530. 
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generally referred to Cleveland’s highly polluted Cuyahoga River and its tendency to 
catch fire, it also aptly describes Cleveland’s piecemeal lakefront development and 
devastated urban environment resulting from over industrialization and poor 
planning.64  
While many plans have been proposed to create a cohesive and publicly 
accessible lakefront, none have managed to enable effective utilization of 
Cleveland’s waterfront. Rather, over the years, the lakefront has experienced more 
“piecemeal” development with the addition of parks, a sports stadium, and more 
recently, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, a science center, and some public 
transportation access.65 However, Cleveland has yet to develop “an accepted balance 
between public uses and private development,” and Cleveland’s underutilized 
lakefront remains the true mistake on the lake.66 Since the 1990s, Cleveland has 
enjoyed an “unexpected renaissance” and has begun to rebuild itself since the city’s 
industrial decline.67 Revitalizing the lakefront is essential to sustaining this 
resurgence, and creating a public-private balance must become a priority for future 
development plans. Therefore, imposing confusing and ambiguous restrictions on 
waterfront land use will only compound the dilemma the city currently faces. To 
enable the best use of Cleveland’s waterfront for the benefit of the public, Ohio’s 
public trust doctrine must be clarified to enable the redevelopment the city so 
desperately needs. 
2. The Evolution of Ohio’s Public Trust Doctrine 
While some states have a robust and well-defined common law or statutory 
public trust doctrine, Ohio’s policies remain unclear.68 Many states have clarified 
and modernized their public trust jurisprudence to incorporate the needs of the 
modern metropolis. This has allowed waterfront areas to experience economic 
growth while protecting the public’s interests.69 In contrast, Ohio’s doctrine remains 
                                                            
 64 Id. 
 65 Keating et al., supra note 6, at 152. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Barney Warf & Brian Holly, The Rise and Fall and Rise of Cleveland, 551 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 208 (May, 1997), available at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/
1047948?uid=3739840&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101535466653. 
 68 State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 679 (Ohio 1916) (“It may be safely said 
that there is scarcely any question which has caused greater conflict of opinion or produced 
more diverse results that that relating to the title of land under water. In many instances 
different conclusions have been arrived at in the same jurisdiction under various 
circumstances. Courts have differed in the method of reasoning, as well as the grounds upon 
which they have arrived at their conclusions.”). 
 69 Massachusetts adopted a modified public trust doctrine in 1983 that allowed for 
economic development of its waterfront. See Susan Diesenhouse, Spurring Growth on 
Boston’s Waterfront, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 1 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/
business/spurring-growth-on-bostons-waterfront.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the 
development of a $900 million office and laboratory complex located on Boston’s waterfront 
that preserves public access to the shore and greenspaces). 
Similar growth can be found in New York. Battery Park City, a newly developed mixed-use 
complex in lower Manhattan near Wall Street, is often cited as a model of successful mixed-
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unclear because neither the courts nor the legislature have clearly defined how public 
trust land can be used without jeopardizing private titles.70 While Ohio originally 
allowed trust land to be used only for “navigational purposes,” trust land use is now 
governed by the equally unclear “public use” standard.71  
As early as 1911, Ohio common law allowed trust land to be used for broad 
navigational purposes. In White v. City of Cleveland, the state of Ohio granted public 
trust land to the City for “park purposes.”72 The City leased part of the artificially 
filled land to a private boat company and authorized the company to construct a 
passenger station, ticket offices, freight warehouses, and structures incidental to the 
freight and passenger business. The court found changing the land’s purpose from 
park to transportation uses was acceptable because it aided the common law public 
purposes of navigation and commerce. In so holding, the court broadly interpreted 
public use to “embrace all such facilities and instrumentalities as will aid and further 
that purpose.”73 The White court also addressed the property interest the City 
acquired in the public trust land, finding that in the absence of express legislative 
intent to grant fee simple title the city only acquired an easement in the land “in aid 
of the very purpose for which the state holds such lands in trust.”74  
In 1916, the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently narrowed the White Court’s 
interpretation of navigation and commerce. The Ohio Supreme Court noted in State 
v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., that regulating the public trust was the state legislature’s 
responsibility.75 Pointing to the absence of legislation and referring to public trust 
land’s historically narrow uses of navigation and water commerce, the Court found 
that, “pending appropriate legislation, [littoral rights] can be exercised only in aid of 
navigation and commerce, and for no other purpose.”76 In doing so, the Court 
affirmatively restricted the purposes for which privately owned filled land could be 
used based on the public’s traditional rights. The Court declined to modify or expand 
traditional trust uses, leaving the door open for the legislature to adopt “appropriate 
                                                            
use waterfront development. Battery Park City is a balanced community of commercial, 
residential, retail, and park space within 92-acres on Manhattan's lower west side. With more 
than five million square feet of environmentally sustainable construction on its site, Battery 
Park City is the largest “green” neighborhood in the world. BATTERY PARK CITY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.batteryparkcity.org/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
 70 Compare White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 311 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911) 
(holding general private boating company’s construction of ticket terminals and passenger 
stations fell under the umbrella of “navigation” and therefore did not violate the public trust), 
with State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 17 Ohio Supp. 137, 145 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 
1945) (declining to determine whether a freeway comported with navigational purposes). 
 71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2012) (stating that public trust lands can be 
used “for the public uses to which they may be adapted”). 
 72 White, 21 Ohio Dec. at 313-16. 
 73 Id. at 330. 
 74 Id. at 331. 
 75 State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 681 (Ohio 1916) (“[T]he power to 
prescribe such regulations [defining the public trust] resides in the Legislature of the state.”). 
 76 Id. at 682 (emphasis added). 
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legislation” to broaden trust uses.77 The White and P.R. Co. cases established a link 
between public rights and the uses to which the land could be put, requiring public 
trust land to be used only in furtherance of navigation and commerce.78  
Inspired by Cleveland & P.R. Co., the Ohio legislature subsequently passed the 
Fleming Act which codified the common law public trust doctrine and established 
the state’s default title to artificially filled land.79 The Fleming Act, as originally 
enacted in 1917, did not broaden the scope of the public’s rights in this land, but 
reconfirmed them as “the [traditional] public rights of navigation and fishery.”80  
In 1945, the Ohio Supreme Court did not redefine permitted trust land uses but 
advocated for a broad interpretation of “navigation”. State ex rel. Squire v. City of 
Cleveland involved a takings claim by littoral owners claiming the City interfered 
with their littoral rights to wharf out to navigable water.81 Because the Fleming Act 
allowed municipalities to build on filled land, title to which was in the state for 
navigational purposes, the court was asked to determine if construction of a freeway 
comported with the city’s rights.82 The court declined to determine whether a 
freeway was consistent with navigation but opined that navigation should be 
interpreted broadly because “it would be ridiculous that the dead hand of the past has 
impressed an irrevocable and inalienable trust upon the resources of the state, limited 
to obsolete and antiquated public uses.”83 The court further found that “the law 
should be flexible enough to be applied to a constantly progressive civilization, and 
by this opinion we do not mean to express any limitation with reference to situations 
as they may arise in the future.”84 Through Squire, Ohio courts seemed to advocate 
for a more expansive, broad interpretation of navigation as it applied to the state’s 
public trust doctrine. 
In the 1950’s, the Ohio Supreme Court altered the public trust doctrine by 
redefining and broadening the “navigability” test used to determine whether an area 
                                                            
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. (finding a littoral owner’s rights can only be exercised in aid of navigation and 
commerce, and “what he does is therefore in furtherance of the object of the trust, and is 
permitted solely on that account”). 
 79 Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); State ex rel. Squire v. 
City of Cleveland, 17 Ohio Supp. 137, 145 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1945) (“There can be little 
doubt that the decision in the Cleveland & P.R. Co. case inspired the preparation and 
enactment of the Fleming Act.”). 
 80 State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 721 (Ohio 1948) (“On March 
20, 1917 . . . the General Assembly passed the Fleming Act. . . . Section 3699-a . . . provided: 
‘It is hereby declared that the waters of Lake Erie . . . do now and have always . . . belonged to 
the state of Ohio as proprietor in trust for the people of the state of Ohio, subject to . . . the 
public rights of navigation and fishery and further subject only to the right of littoral 
owners  . . . to make reasonable use of the waters in front of or flowing past their lands. . . . 
Any artificial . . . fills or otherwise beyond the natural shore line . . . shall not be considered as 
having prejudiced the rights of the public in such domain.’” (emphasis added)).  
 81 Id. at 709. 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. at 729-30. 
 84 Id.  
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falls within the public trust.85 The traditional test used to determine when a body of 
water is held in the public trust is whether it is capable of commercial navigation (the 
“navigability test”).86 The public right of navigation is also one of the traditional 
rights the public possess in the trust resources.87 Courts often treat the ideas 
synonymously, so an expansion of the navigability test could lead to an expansion to 
the public’s right of navigation. In Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor 
Lagoons, Inc. and Coleman v. Schaeffer, the court expanded the navigability test to 
include not only traditional commercial navigation but recreational boating as well.88 
The Mentor court considered the waterway’s increased use for recreational boating 
and the decreased use for commerce.89 With this in mind, the court expanded the 
public trust doctrine’s scope to include waterways that could accommodate 
recreational use as well as traditional commercial vessels.90 Under this theory the 
                                                            
 85 See Coleman v. Schaeffer, 126 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio 1955); Mentor Harbor Yachting 
Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 163 N.E.2d 373, 378 (Ohio 1959). 
 86 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1233 (2012). 
 87 White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 311, 328 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911). 
 88 Coleman, 126 N.E.2d at 446 (“[T]he definition or test of navigability to be applied to 
our inland lakes must be sufficiently broad and liberal to include all the public uses, including 
boating for pleasure, for which such waters are adapted. So long as they continue capable of 
being put to any beneficial public use, they are public waters.” (quoting Lamprey v. State, 53 
N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893))). 
In a discussion of the change in the concept of navigability, the following summary appears in 
56 AM. JUR. Venue—Wharves § 181, 648-49: 
There is, however, much authority for the view, which has been spoken of as being the 
better rule, that it is not necessary that the water be capable of commerce of pecuniary 
value, and that boating or sailing for pleasure should be considered navigation as well 
as boating for mere pecuniary profit. And the expression is frequently used that 
navigability for pleasure is as sacred in the eye of the law as navigability for any other 
purpose. It has been held that the term “navigable,” as used in a statute relating to the 
ownership of submerged land, includes waters which are naturally available for use by 
the public for boating, fishing, etc., although they may not be susceptible of use for 
general commercial navigation. 
Furthermore, in the case of Lamprey, the court stated: 
The division of waters into navigable and non-navigable is merely a method of 
dividing them into public and private, which is the more natural classification; and the 
definition or test of navigability to be applied to our inland lakes must be sufficiently 
broad and liberal to include all the public uses, including boating for pleasure, for 
which such waters are adapted. So long as they continue capable of being put to any 
beneficial public use, they are public waters. 
Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143. 
 89 Mentor, 163 N.E.2d at 378 (finding the increased recreational use of water has been 
accompanied by a corresponding lessening of their use for commerce). 
 90 State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1975) (finding the Coleman and Mentor courts’ legal construction balanced harmony with the 
nature of the public’s water use). This view is in accord with the court in State v. Cleveland & 
P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 680 (Ohio 1916), finding “[i]f navigation is held supreme, the very 
purpose for which it exists may be defeated by its own demands.” (quoting 1 FARNHAM ON 
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court held, “We are in accord with the modern view that navigation for pleasure and 
recreation is as important in the eyes of the law as navigation for a commercial 
purpose.”91  
In State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., an Ohio appeals court pointed 
out the continuing lack of clarity in Ohio’s public trust statute.92 The court 
specifically noted the lack of any statutory definition of the term “navigable waters” 
and upheld the expanded navigability test applied by the Mentor and Coleman 
courts.93 The distinction between navigability and the public right of navigation is a 
muddy one, and courts have sometimes addressed them as a single concept. For 
example, a Toledo municipal court found that hunting was a protected public trust 
right under the recreational use prong of the newly expanded navigability test.94 
Following this reasoning, the public’s right of navigation could logically be 
expanded to encompass all of the additional uses considered in determining a 
waterway’s navigability.95  
However, even after adopting the expanded navigability test, courts continued to 
strictly define the public’s right of navigation, limiting the ways filled land could be 
used. In Thomas v. Sanders, an Ohio appellate court found that artificially filled 
public trust land, title to which was held by a private party, could only be used in aid 
of navigation.96 The court found, “the state, as trustee for the people, cannot…permit 
a diversion of it to private uses different from the object for which the trust was 
created…So long as the [owner] maintained [the land] . . . in aid of navigation it was 
exercising its right to do so.”97 In light of these decisions, Ohio courts’ varying 
interpretations of the navigation, public rights, and land use restrictions continued to 
be unclear until the legislature again took action to clarify the public trust doctrine.  
In 1988, the Ohio legislature revised the Fleming Act with two significant 
changes.98 First, the legislature explicitly applied the public trust to artificially filled 
                                                            
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 521). The Ohio Supreme Court encouraged a flexible view of 
navigation that would ultimately facilitate the purposes of the public trust doctrine. Id. 
 91 Mentor, 163 N.E.2d at 378. 
 92 Brown, 336 N.E.2d at 457. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Toledo v. Kilburn, 654 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Toledo Mun. Ct. 1995) (“[T]he regulation of 
hunting is a regulation in furtherance of the aid of navigation and water commerce, as that 
definition is to include recreational and commercial use.”). This seems to be an incorrect 
application of the recreational use test to the public right of navigation question.  
 95 Interestingly, other jurisdictions have also expanded the public trust doctrine to 
encompass “the preservation of the land in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, for open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life.” Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
Further, by meeting the expanding needs of modern civilization, it has been argued that the 
public trust has now come full circle to coincide with the principles of old Roman Law once 
again. See Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the 
People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 223 (1980). 
 96 Thomas v. Sanders, 413 N.E.2d 1224, 1231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). 
 97 Id.  
 98 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506 (West 2012) (effective March 15, 1988). 
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land.99 Second, instead of basing the doctrine on protecting specific public rights, the 
legislature now broadly established that trust resources could be used for “the public 
uses to which they may be adapted.”100 In doing so, the legislature embraced the 
                                                            
 99 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11 (West 2012) (“‘Territory,’as used in this section, 
means the waters and the lands presently underlying the waters of Lake Erie and the lands 
formerly underlying the waters of Lake Erie and now artificially filled, between the natural 
shoreline and the international boundary line with Canada.”). 
The public trust doctrine clearly applies to all land underlying navigable water. State v. 
Cleveland-Pittsburgh Ry., 25 Ohio C.D. 630, 651 (Ohio Ct. App. 1914). However, courts have 
only more recently applied the trust to artificially filled land. Id. The ownership of waterfront 
land differs from that of other land. The word “littoral” means “of or relating to the coast or 
shore of an ocean, sea, or lake,” and “littoral rights are those ownership rights of a property 
owner whose land abuts a lake to the use and enjoyment of the waters and land underlying the 
lake.” 53 OHIO JUR. Harbors, Marinas, and Wharves § 10 (3d ed.). Under Ohio law, a littoral 
owner automatically acquires title to shoreline property gained gradually and imperceptibly 
through the operation of natural causes. Lake Front E. 55th St. Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 7 
Ohio Supp. 17, 30 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1939); see, e.g., Lamb v. Rickets, 11 Ohio 311 
(1842); Baumhart v. McClure, 153 N.E. 211, 211 (Ohio 1926). However, when a littoral 
owner fills in land underlying a body of water by his own actions, he does not gain title to the 
newly created land. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 949 
(Ohio 2011). Title to this filled land is vested in the state of Ohio as part of the public trust. Id; 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506 (West 2012). Thus, all land created by artificially filling areas 
of Lake Erie, by default, falls within the scope of the public trust doctrine and is therefore held 
in trust for the people by the State of Ohio. See Merril, 955 N.E.2d at 949 (holding that 
artificial filling of the lakebed would not diminish lands subject to the public trust and expand 
littoral property). Interestingly, some states do not include artificially filled land in their public 
trust. See, e.g., Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038 (R.I. 1995) 
(finding public trust does not apply to filled lands and owners hold title in fee simple 
absolute). 
Because the doctrine has been applied to filled land, it impacts a significant amount of Ohio’s 
waterfront. See generally Keating et al., supra note 6 (discussing many locations where 
artificial fill has been added to Ohio’s shoreline, including land north of the shoreway, North 
Coast Harbor, Burke Lakefront Airport, and much land underlying the former railroads). Nine 
of Ohio’s counties have been designated as coastal counties by the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources. OHIO DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, OFFICE OF COASTAL MANAGEMENT, 
OHIO COASTAL ATLAS, http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/tabid/23367/Default.aspx. Cuyahoga 
County alone has nearly 30 miles of shoreline, with much of the area near Cleveland 
consisting of artificial fill. See OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, COUNTY MAPS, 
http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/13/Atlas_Maps_GIS/D-CMA_locatorMaps/cuyahoga_5_
cuyahoga_river_at_mouth.pdf and http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/13/Atlas_Maps_GIS/D-
CMA_locatorMaps/cuyahoga_8_burke_lakefront_airport.pdf (indicating artificially filled land 
in blue). 
 100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2012) (“It is hereby declared that the waters of 
Lake Erie consisting of the territory within the boundaries of the state, extending from the 
southerly shore of Lake Erie to the international boundary line between the United States and 
Canada, together with the soil beneath and their contents, do now belong and have always, 
since the organization of the state of Ohio, belonged to the state as proprietor in trust for the 
people of the state, for the public uses to which they may be adapted, subject to the powers of 
the United States government, to the public rights of navigation, water commerce, and fishery, 
and to the property rights of littoral owners, including the right to make reasonable use of the 
waters in front of or flowing past their lands.” (emphasis added)). 
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Ohio Supreme Court’s recommendations in Squire, allowing for the modernization 
of the public trust and the general trend to expand the doctrine.101 Since codification, 
Ohio courts have not addressed trust land use under the new, expanded doctrine and 
the myriad questions surrounding the trust’s traditional navigation requirements are 
still not easily answered. The question now turns from “what is a navigational 
purpose?” to “what is a public use?”  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. What is a Public Use? 
Although the Ohio legislature intended to clarify the murky public trust doctrine 
in 1988, the new public use restriction remains uncertain. Ohio courts have not yet 
specifically addressed the limits of public use as the legislature redefined it in 
1988.102 However “public use” has been the subject of several recent United States 
Supreme Court cases relating to Fifth Amendment takings. Under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, a governmental taking must be for a 
legitimate public use, which the court equates with public purpose.103 In this context 
the court has defined public purpose to include anything that results in a public 
economic benefit.104 In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court found the 
following to be consistent with the public purpose requirement: building a private 
hotel, restaurants, shopping facilities, recreational and commercial marinas, 
residences, and a commercial research facility.105  
The broad public purpose test embraced in Kelo can be reconciled with some 
states’ public trust doctrines. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court endorsed a broad definition of public purpose in a proposed bill, which would 
encompass “any…purpose for which any real estate has been, could now be, or may 
in the future be lawfully used.”106 On the other hand, some jurisdictions have 
interpreted public purpose more narrowly. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court 
prevented a private company from constructing a steel mill on public trust land, 
finding the legislature’s proposed public purpose was only incidental to the “direct 
                                                            
 101 State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 730 (Ohio 1948). 
 102 Since the Fleming Act’s revision, cases interpreting the public trust doctrine have 
focused primarily on the trust’s boundary line and the state’s ability to enter into submerged 
land leases. See, e.g., Beach Cliff Bd. of Tr. v. Ferchill, No. 81327, 2003 WL 21027604 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 8, 2003); Sandusky Marina Ltd. P’ship v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., 701 
N.E.2d 302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Shnittker v. State, No. OOAP-976, 2001 WL 410280 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2001); Manifold v. Gaydos, No. OT-06-021, 2007 WL 431569 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 2, 2007).  
 103 See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937); Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (equating the terms “public use” and “public purpose” as 
having identical meanings). 
 104 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485 (“It would be incongruous to hold that the City's interest in the 
economic benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a 
public character than any of those other interests. Clearly, there is no basis for exempting 
economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Opinion of the Justices to Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1110 (Mass. 1981). 
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and dominating purpose of private gain.”107 In light of these varying standards, it is 
clear that applying the Kelo takings interpretation of public purpose to public trust 
law is not a perfect fit.  
Ohio’s historical public trust doctrine jurisprudence can be reconciled with the 
Kelo public purpose test; consequently, it is appropriate to apply the Kelo to this 
state’s public trust doctrine. In White, the question presented was whether public 
trust land, originally appropriated for a public park, could be leased to a private 
company that restricted the public’s access to the waterfront.108 The court found this 
private activity an acceptable public use because, “it fills an undisputed necessity 
existing in regard to these common carriers by water, who are themselves engaged in 
fulfilling their obligations to the general public, obligations which could not 
otherwise be properly or effectually performed; and in filling the necessity for such 
accommodation, the city or the state is only performing its public duty.”109 
Furthermore, the court found that when a legislature states that a use benefits the 
public, “the courts should not lightly disregard such declarations.”110 This 
interpretation is consistent with Kelo, which equates generally private uses with a 
public benefit. 
If the scope of Ohio’s public trust doctrine is defined using Kelo’s definition of 
public purpose, the revised Fleming Act will permit land to be used in any way that 
ultimately or tangentially benefits the public.111 These uses are relatively unlimited. 
Such scope is inconsistent with the doctrine’s historical objective to protect the 
valuable water resources of the state for the people and to “attack a legal system of 
land ownership that is environmentally unsound.”112 Applying the Kelo public 
purpose interpretation to the public trust doctrine, in essence, extinguishes the public 
trust doctrine altogether. Allowing public trust land to be used for any purpose 
without regard to public rights will destroy any protections that the public trust 
doctrine once provided. However, the question remains unanswered: If the Kelo 
interpretation is too broad, under what test should Ohio’s public purpose requirement 
be judged? This question has no immediate answer, and Ohio’s legislature and 
courts have yet to provide guidance on this issue.  
Clearly, differing interpretations of Ohio’s public trust doctrine will achieve 
different results. If the doctrine is interpreted too narrowly it can prevent beneficial 
development. Waterfront land can be used to benefit the public, and redevelopment 
plans can bring millions of dollars into declining urban neighborhoods.113 Renewal 
plans stimulate the local economy and increase land values and tax revenue to 
                                                            
 107 People ex rel. Scott v. Chi. Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976). 
 108 White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 311 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911). 
 109 Id. at 324-25 (citing In re City of New York, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892)). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005). 
 112 Timothy Patrick Brady, But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to be Born: The Public 
Trust Doctrine, Nepa, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 621, 645 
(1990). 
 113 See Amanda Abrams, Southwest Waterfront: A Neighborhood Where a Change is 
Gonna Come, URBAN TURF (Dec. 2, 2010), http://dc.urbanturf.com/articles/blog/southwest_
waterfront_a_neighborhood_where_a_change_is_gonna_come/2718. 
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blighted areas.114 As discussed above, unclear title restrictions may prevent much-
needed public and private redevelopment in waterfront areas. Conversely, an 
overbroad doctrine may allow unfettered development to restrict the public’s access 
to the waterfront.115  
B. Issues Stemming from Ohio’s Unclear Public Trust Doctrine 
Failing to define how Ohio public trust land can be used creates several problems 
relating to waterfront development. First and foremost, when there is no clear law 
defining how public trust land can be used land owners could jeopardize their private 
title unwittingly. Furthermore, such ambiguities could lead to financing problems, 
and may cause years of litigation that will likely hurt the very people the doctrine 
was meant to benefit—the people of Ohio.  
First, because the nebulous “public purpose” requirement can be interpreted in 
many ways, it is impossible to know exactly what purposes are allowed under the 
Fleming Act. For example, the state of Ohio could argue that the private film studio 
which a development team proposed to construct on Cleveland’s waterfront does not 
meet the public purpose requirement as historically interpreted under Ohio law.116 
The City could conversely argue that private business operations benefit the public at 
large and do fulfill the public purpose requirement as more recently defined in the 
Supreme Court’s Kelo decision. If the state wins, it could void Cleveland’s private 
title to the land at issue and halt construction or otherwise take over the project. At 
the very least, this could result in years of litigation which would negatively impact 
Cleveland’s economy and may stifle the City’s desire and ability to seek out new 
projects. Moreover, since the proposed film studio is only a part of the overall 
development project, it is unclear whether a allowing for a partially private use could 
comport with either or both interpretations of “public purposes.” 
Second, although arguably not the case in the Cleveland example, uncertain title 
restrictions may lead developers to shy away from investing in projects on public 
trust land. Developers do not want to risk dealing with the legal ramifications of an 
undefined title restriction that could “mak[e] financing difficult to obtain by 
obstructing the alienability of property to the extent that it obscures clear title to 
                                                            
 114 Downtown Waterfront URA: Overview, Portland Dev. Comm’n, http://www.pdc.us/our-
work/urban-renewal-areas/downtown-waterfront/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) 
(“The Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Area (DTWF URA) is one of Portland’s most 
successful examples of urban renewal and tax increment financing. Since 2001, assessed land 
values in the DTWF URA have increased an average of four percent annually, from a total of 
$653 million to $918 million.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Karen L. Ferguson, This Land is Our Land: Private Interests in Public Lands, 
2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 245-46 (1997) (“The future portends of continued urbanization 
and the risk of major loss of natural qualities. The state . . . is in the best position to protect 
such lands from risk. Once the lands are in private hands all options for the public are lost.”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 116 Jarboe McFee, supra note 50. In response to the City of Cleveland’s RFQ, a local real 
estate developer submitted a proposal that included a film studio and theater college that 
would build upon the recent film-industry traffic in Cleveland, the site of several movies 
filmed in 2012 and 2013. 
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land.”117 Given the cost of major development projects, the risks of uncertain title 
may be too much to bear.118 
In Rhode Island, a littoral land owner seeking to develop its land faced 
insurmountable financing difficulties because various title companies involved in the 
financing transactions were concerned with the public trust implications of 
                                                            
 117 Hoffman, supra note 41, at 484-85; see also Keating et al., supra note 53, at 135 (“A 
1916 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court had found the State of Ohio to be the trustee of the 
people and hold the rights to the land under the water of Lake Erie. Without clear title to the 
land, no planning or development could proceed.”). As illustrated by Massachusetts litigation 
over the city of Boston’s waterfront: “[Uncertain title restrictions] particularly frightened 
Boston waterfront owners, as it appeared to significantly cloud the title to their properties. 
Boston Waterfront dredged up the very real fear that if formerly tidal or submerged lands were 
utilized for something other than a public purpose, the state government had the right to 
reclaim those lands in defense of the public trust.” William J. Bussiere, Extinguishing Dried-
Up Public Trust Rights, 91 B. U. L. REV. 1749, 1762-63 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Developers fear title loss even more when the law leaves these restrictions 
essentially undefined. 
These uncertainties were articulated by the Mississippi legislature and included in tidelands 
legislation:  
The Legislature finds that certainty and stability of the land titles of riparian and 
littoral property owners along the banks of the navigable rivers and waterways on the 
borders and in the interior of the state and along the shores of the tidally affected 
waters of the state are essential to the economic welfare of the state and to the peace, 
tranquility and financial security of the many thousands of citizens who own such 
lands; that a dispute has developed with respect to such lands bordering on tidally 
affected waters, calling into question titles and legal issues believed secure and 
determined from the date of statehood; that this dispute has cast a doubt and cloud 
over the titles to all littoral lands and all riparian lands along the rivers and shorelines 
of the coastal area to such a degree that land sales are being prevented, business and 
home purchasing has been made difficult or impossible, industrial financing based on 
such titles has become unavailable, and homeowners and other owners have been 
rendered apprehensive as to their security in their ownership. Economic growth and 
development in the coastal counties are at a virtual standstill, creating a constantly 
increasing and incalculable loss of dollars to the area as well as the loss of countless 
new jobs for the average citizens of this state. The Legislature finds that this dispute 
has already caused extensive harm, is intolerable, and immediate resolution is required 
and would serve the higher public purpose, in order that public trust tidelands and 
submerged lands may be utilized through their normal interface with the fast lands in 
furtherance of all the usual purposes of the trust. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1 (2012). 
 118 Many waterfront development projects cost millions or billions of dollars. See Abrams, 
supra note 113 (“The biggest news for the area is the projected renovation of the Waterfront, 
slated to begin in 2012. Occurring in three phases that won’t be completed until 2018, the $1.5 
billion, 26-acre project will result in a radically changed area, one with 60 percent open space 
in the form of public piers, parks, plazas, pedestrian streets, and a farmers market to 
complement the fish market.”); Elaine Howard, City of Salem South Waterfront Urban 
Renewal Feasibility Study, at 35, CITY OF SALEM, OREGON (Mar. 2007), http://www.
cityofsalem.net/Departments/UrbanDevelopment/UrbanRenewalAreas/Documents/SWF/swf_
ur_feasibility_study_02_07.pdf (finding total costs of the project to be approximately $8.5 
million for the primary phase and approximately $4.6 million for the second phase). 
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ownership and use.119 When the Rhode Island Supreme Court subsequently clarified 
the public trust doctrine and held that it was extinguished in lands granted by the 
state and improved by the owner,120 there sprung “a ray of hope upon which to 
resolve [this] title and project financing dilemma.”121 Based on the clarifying 
opinion, the littoral owner gained fee simple title to the land and resolved its 
financing difficulties.122 Ohio has no such “ray of hope” to combat title uncertainties 
and development challenges. While this Author does not contend the Rhode Island 
interpretation is the correct one, this Author applauds Rhode Island’s effort to bring 
clarity to this murky doctrine.  
Finally, placing restrictions on artificially-filled land presents unique problems 
when the original shoreline cannot be clearly determined. In State ex rel. Merrill, the 
Ohio Supreme Court found that artificial fill cannot alter the boundary of the public 
trust; the line remains where water usually stands when free from disturbing 
causes.123 The court declined to discuss exactly how the natural shoreline might be 
determined when the land was artificially filled and the water no longer stands at the 
original shoreline.124 This compounds the uncertainty permeating Ohio’s public trust 
because locating much of Lake Erie’s natural shoreline may be challenging or 
impossible when the waterfront has been filled in for decades.125 Further, if the 
original shoreline is indeterminable, it is impossible to know with certainty which 
land is impressed with the public trust.  
C. The Public Trust: An Affirmative or Negative Restriction?  
To understand the varied approaches states have used to define their respective 
public trust doctrines it is helpful to appreciate the differences between affirmative 
and negative use restrictions. A thorough survey of various states’ public trust 
doctrines reveals two divergent theories which prescribe how trust land can be used. 
These theories, based on real estate law terminology, can be described as either 
affirmative use restrictions or negative use restrictions. These restrictions define the 
scope of permitted uses and ultimately determine whether a state’s doctrine will be 
interpreted broadly or narrowly.  
                                                            
 119 Providence & Worcester R. Co. v. Pine, 729 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 1999). 
 120 Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 1995). 
 121 Providence & Worcester R. Co., 729 A.2d at 205.  
 122 Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1044. 
 123 State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dep't of Natural Res., 955 N.E.2d 935, 949 (Ohio 2011). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Arno v. Commonwealth, 931 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 2010) (“[B]ecause actual high and 
low water marks can change over time, notably pursuant to licenses to fill fiats and submerged 
lands with soil, the starting point for determining the public's rights in tidelands (filled or 
unfilled) must be the historic, or ‘primitive,’ high and low water marks. Absent some fixed 
date in the relatively recent past to which fact finders could turn . . . [a court] could only direct 
the inquiry back to the very beginning.”); see also White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 
311 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911) (discussing the impact of artificially filled land in Lake Erie 
as early as 1911). 
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An affirmative use restriction only allows land to be used for purposes which the 
legislature has specifically allowed.126 For example, Idaho’s public trust doctrine 
requires that “the state must demonstrate not only that certain public uses will not be 
interfered with or only minimally interfered with; it must demonstrate that the 
purpose for the encumbrance of the state-owned lands is in fact a public one.”127 
Furthermore, Idaho’s public trust statute limits authorized land uses to: “navigation, 
commerce, recreation, agriculture, mining, forestry, or other uses.”128 States that 
apply such an affirmative use restriction create a strong public trust doctrine which 
allows land to be used only for these limited purposes.  
On the other hand, negative use restrictions permit land to be used for any 
purpose that does not violate or impede specific uses or rights.129 For example, 
Michigan allows trust land to be used as long as the use does not interfere with the 
public rights.130 Applying this negative use restriction employs a broader approach to 
the public trust doctrine’s scope because it permits land use for any general purpose 
so long as it does not impede the public’s rights. Michigan’s negative use restriction 
has been codified in The Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, which is “essentially a 
codification of the public trust doctrine for the Great Lakes.”131 This Act allows for 
the sale or disposition of public trust land and the filling of submerged land 
“whenever…the private or public use of those lands and waters will not substantially 
affect the public use of those lands and waters for hunting, fishing, swimming, 
pleasure boating, or navigation or that the public trust in the state will not be 
impaired…”132 The Act further states that the state may sell, lease or permit filling in 
submerged land, “after finding that the public trust will not be impaired or 
                                                            
 126 John G. Cameron, Jr., Restrictive Covenants, Reciprocal Negative Easements, and 
Building and Use Restrictions Don't Underestimate the Strength of Use Restrictions, PRAC. 
REAL EST. L. 47, 50 (Sept. 2010); Dean v. Hanson, No. 99 10739 CH, 2000 WL 35532059, at 
II (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). 
 127 Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1097 
(Idaho 1983) (Bakes, J., concurring). 
 128 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (West 2013). 
 129 Distinguishing between affirmative and negative restrictions is founded in real estate 
law and provides a good analogy to the two interpretations of the public trust doctrine. See 
Cameron, supra note 126, at 47, 50 (“Affirmative/Negative Restrictions. Whether the 
restriction is stated in the affirmative or the negative has an important bearing on how it will 
be construed. Affirmative use restrictions (those stating that property must be used in a certain 
way) will preclude all other uses. However, negative use restrictions (those stating that 
property may not be used for enumerated purposes) allow the property to be used for all other 
purposes.”). 
 130 Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 164 (Mich. 1930) (emphasis added); see also Obrecht v. 
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Mich. 1960) (“The private right to appropriate is 
subject not only to the rights of lower owners, but to the initial limitation that it may not 
substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health.’”). 
 131 Eric Nelson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes: Glass v. Goeckel, 11 ALB. 
L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 131, 152 (2006) (citing Chris A. Shafer, Public Rights in Michigan's 
Streams: Toward a Modern Definition of Navigability, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 9, 85 (1999)). 
 132 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32502 (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
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substantially injured.”133 Courts interpreting this Act have held that the Act does not 
limit authorized use of public trust lands to only those uses which benefitted the 
public interest.134 In fact, the state need not make a finding that use of public trust 
land is beneficial to the public interest; the state need only show that the public 
rights are not impaired.135  
Ohio has historically embraced a narrow interpretation of the public trust 
doctrine’s use restriction. The doctrine was originally an affirmative use restriction 
which limited the purposes for which trust land could be used.136 An early Ohio case 
stated that “[littoral rights] can be exercised only in aid of navigation and commerce, 
and for no other purpose.”137 The court in White found that land held under the 
public trust “must embrace all such facilities and instrumentalities as will aid and 
further [the public purposes of navigation and commerce].”138 
The Fleming Act redefined Ohio’s affirmative use restriction and effectively 
ameliorated any limits which had been imposed under the traditional doctrine. The 
Fleming Act, as revised in 1988, is technically consistent with the traditional 
affirmative use restriction, stating that lands held in trust by the state of Ohio may be 
used “for the public uses to which they may be adapted.”139 However, the Act’s 
arguably unlimited and undefined public purpose requirement is directly at odds 
with the doctrine’s fundamental tenet of limiting how trust land can be used. For, 
under the Kelo’s broad interpretation, a public purpose is essentially any purpose.140 
                                                            
 133 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32505 (West 2013). 
 134 Ferguson, supra note 115, at 210. 
 135 Superior Pub. Rights, Inc. v. State Dept. of Natural Res., 263 N.W.2d 290, 297 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1977) (“Plaintiff interprets the aforementioned section to require the defendant DNR 
to find that every private use of public trust lands is in itself beneficial to the public interest 
before authorizing the use. Such an interpretation is clearly erroneous.”). 
 136 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506 (West 2012) (effective March 15, 1988) (stating that 
public trust land can be used “for the public uses to which they may be adapted”). 
 137 State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916) (emphasis added). 
 138 White v. City of Cleveland, 21 Ohio Dec. 311, 317 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1911) 
(emphasis added). The court went on to state, “[the] right of the riparian owner includes the 
right of access to navigable water, and the consequential right to wharf out to navigable water, 
so as to make his right practicable and available, in aid of the very purpose for which the state 
holds such lands in trust.” Id. at 331 (emphasis added). However, the court seems to 
contradict this statement in the very next sentence, stating, “[i]n fact such trust must be held to 
include this right on the part of the riparian owner to wharf out, so long as he does not 
interfere with the public right of navigation and commerce.” Id. Interestingly, the Ohio 
Legislature imposes only a negative use restriction based on traditional public rights on land 
that the state owns and leases: “Whenever the state . . . determines that any part of the territory 
can be developed and improved . . . without impairment of the public right of navigation, 
water commerce, and fishery, a lease of all or any part of the state's interest therein may be 
entered into with the applicant.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.11 (West 2012). 
 139 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.10 (West 2012). 
 140 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005); C/S 12th Ave. LLC v. City of 
New York, 32 A.D.3d 1, 10-11, (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (citing Kelo and finding that the term 
“public use” broadly encompasses any use which contributes to the health, safety and general 
welfare of the public, and that this use only needs to be rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose). 
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With this definition, the traditional limits which Ohio’s public trust doctrine imposed 
become ineffective. This overbroad interpretation would no longer resemble an 
affirmative use restriction because it would give littoral owners carte blanche to use 
the land for whatever could be deemed a public purpose.  
Interpreting the public purpose requirement narrowly would maintain the 
integrity of Ohio’s historical affirmative use restriction but, as discussed in part IIIB, 
such an interpretation could prohibit beneficial waterfront development. The key to 
clarifying Ohio’s public trust doctrine must necessarily come by balancing these two 
interpretations. Ohio must adopt a public trust doctrine that balances public rights 
while allowing for the highest and best use of Ohio’s valuable and limited waterfront 
land. 
D. Using Public Trust Land in Other States: Permitted Public Trust Purposes 
Each state defines its public doctrine independently, creating vast differences 
between each states’ interpretation. As discussed in section B2, Ohio’s doctrine 
employs a generic “public purpose” test to determine whether land use is permitted 
under the public trust statute but does not further establish what uses are permitted 
under this standard. Other states have created tests through which they can determine 
whether a use is permitted under their public trust doctrine.  
1. Massachusetts’ Public Trust Balancing Test 
In contrast to Ohio’s undefined public purpose test, Massachusetts took action to 
define allowable public trust land use. Under Massachusetts’ early public trust 
doctrine, land could be used for “all useful purposes.”141 The state later codified its 
public trust, requiring trust land to be used for a “proper public purpose.”142 Due to 
this unclear standard, land owners and investors were hesitant to develop waterfront 
property.143 Massachusetts addressed this problem by enacting a licensing procedure 
for privately owned trust land utilizing a public purpose test in which the public 
benefits must outweigh the public detriments.144  
“The main thrust of the legislation is to limit development in the regulated areas 
so far as possible to ‘water-dependent uses,’ which understandably conflicts with the 
desires of developers who regard waterfront sites as very attractive for such things as 
hotels, restaurants and condominiums, which the regulations specifically decree to 
be not water-dependent.”145 A regulatory agency is invested with the power, akin to 
                                                            
 141 Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909) (finding the 
doctrine distinguished navigation and fishing as “principal,” but not exclusive, purposes for 
which public trust land could be used). 
 142 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 2 (West 2012). 
 143 See Jane F. Carlson, The Public Trust and Urban Waterfront Development in 
Massachusetts: What is a Public Purpose?, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71, 71 (1983) (finding 
that Massachusetts’ unclear doctrine led to uncertainty because owners did not know when the 
state might assert the condition subsequent and retake title to the land). 
 144 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 18B (West 2012); William L. Lahey, Chapter 91 
Regulations: The Commonwealth Moves Toward Statewide Zoning, 35 BOSTON B.J. 21, 24 
(Mar./Apr. 1991). 
 145 EDWARD MENDLER, MASSACHUSETTS CONVEYANCERS' HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 13:12 
(4th ed.). 
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zoning discretionary permit power, to apply a balancing test determine whether a 
proposed use is appropriate and to govern design and dimensions of a 
development.146 The balancing test is applied more strictly to state-owned trust land; 
requiring a public purpose that provides a greater public benefit than public 
detriment to the land.147 In addition, the regulations impose land-use controls such as 
setback requirements and height limitations on many buildings abutting the coast.148 
The public purpose test utilizes the following factors: “[the] purpose and effect of 
the development; the impact on abutters and the surrounding community; 
enhancement to the property; benefits to the public trust rights in tidelands or other 
associated rights, including, but not limited to, benefits provided through previously 
obtained municipal permits; community activities on the development site; 
environmental protection and preservation; public health and safety; and the general 
welfare.”149 In 2007, the Massachusetts legislature limited the areas to which the 
public trust applies by exempting landlocked owners from the Chapter 91 licensing 
requirements when title to landlocked property was privately held before 1975.150  
In sum, the Massachusetts’ plan seeks to balance the interests of the public by 
preserving access to water resources against those of developers and proponents of 
economically beneficial land use. While preserving the public’s rights, the 
legislature has taken control of land use to allow for economic growth and 
development. This control permits the state to effectuate the true spirit of the public 
trust doctrine: to preserve water resources for the public for their benefit.  
2. Wisconsin’s Balanced Approach to an Affirmative Use Restriction 
Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine seems to be based upon an affirmative use 
restriction somewhat similar to Ohio’s; however, Wisconsin applies a balancing test 
that weighs divergent public interests when determining whether to permit public 
trust land use. Like Ohio, Wisconsin places an affirmative use restriction on public 
trust land. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals articulated this affirmative restriction in 
State v. Village of Lake Delton, permitting land use only when it furthered the 
interests of the trust. The court held, “whether the power is exercised by the 
legislature or by a delegee it must be exercised for the benefit of the public.”151 In 
State v. Bleck, the Wisconsin Supreme Court later held, “[A]lthough the state holds 
the beds of navigable waters in trust for the public, it may authorize limited 
encroachments upon the beds of such waters where the public interest will be 
                                                            
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 18B (West 2012). 
 150 Moot v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 923 N.E.2d 81, 84 (Mass. 2010) (“Section 18 no longer 
requires a license for fill on landlocked tidelands, or for uses or structures within such 
tidelands. This does not, however, entirely dispose of the public's rights in landlocked 
tidelands, which G.L. c. 91 continues to require the department to ‘preserve and protect.’”). 
 151 State v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis 
added). 
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served.152 This articulation is congruent with Ohio’s R.C. 1506.10 and subsequent 
interpretations allowing trust land use for public purposes rather than allowing uses 
which do not hinder public rights.  
Wisconsin imposes a balancing test upon the public trust analysis which allows 
some measure of clarification. For example, in Lake Delton, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals considered both the public’s interest in hunting and fishing and the public’s 
economic interest in using a water resource for water skiing shows to attract tourists. 
The court found that that “[some] public interests must yield to other public interests 
served by the proposal [to use the lake for water skiing exhibitions].”153 The court 
found public rights are not absolute and “must yield if other public uses are to exist 
at all. The uses must be balanced and accommodated on a case by case basis.”154 
This balancing test is to be applied before granting a permit for a proposed project.155  
In contrast, Ohio’s affirmative restriction does not apply any such balancing 
factors in determining whether a public purpose is permissible. Rather, under a broad 
interpretation of public purpose, it gives carte blanche to all uses without 
consideration of what public rights might be impaired. Under this interpretation, 
Ohio’s public trust doctrine may become overbroad, allowing public rights to be 
abrogated completely. 
3. The Rhode Island Interpretation 
The State of Rhode Island has taken a much narrower view of the public trust 
doctrine, finding it extinguished in artificially filled land. In Greater Providence 
Chamber of Commerce v. State, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether 
creating land by filling below mean high tide extinguishes the public-trust rights in 
the reclaimed land.156 The court found, “[A] littoral owner who fills along his or her 
shore line, whether to a harbor line or otherwise, with the acquiescence or the 
express or implied approval of the state and improves upon the land in justifiable 
reliance on the approval, would be able to establish title to that land that is free and 
clear.”157 The title will vest in fee simple absolute so long as the littoral owner “has 
not created any interference with the public-trust rights of fishery, commerce, and 
navigation.”158 Therefore, in contrast to Ohio or Massachusetts law which finds use 
of artificially filled land limited by the public trust, Rhode Island law allows littoral 
owners to completely extinguish public trust limitations so long as their use does not 
initially obstruct basic public rights.  
                                                            
 152 State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Wis. 1983) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court also articulated a negative use restriction in Bleck, finding: “DNR may grant a 
permit to a riparian to place a structure only if that structure does not materially obstruct 
navigation, or reduce the effective flood flow capacity of a stream, or if it is not detrimental to 
the public interest.” Id. 
 153 Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d at 631. 
 154 Id. at 632. 
 155 Village of Menomonee Falls v. Wis. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 412 N.W.2d 505, 510 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1987). 
 156 Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State 657 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 1995). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/9
2013] PARADISE LOST? 1101 
 
Such a lenient interpretation essentially nullifies the fundamental tenet of the 
public trust doctrine—to protect the nation’s water resources for the use and benefit 
of the public. While Rhode Island law does initially protect against interfering with 
the public rights of fishery, navigation and commerce, it does nothing to protect 
these rights once title has transferred to the littoral owner in fee simple. A balance 
between Ohio’s restrictive historical interpretation and Rhode Island’s lenient 
interpretation of the public trust doctrine must be struck to enable both littoral 
owners and the public use of and access to this valuable resource. 
E. A Proposed Solution for Ohio 
In light of Cleveland’s plans to move forward with lakefront development on 
public trust land, it is imperative that Ohio’s public purpose requirement is clearly 
defined to promote the highest and best use of lakefront property.159 Rather than 
creating an absolute ban on development or allowing for unfettered growth,160 Ohio 
should define its public purpose requirement by implementing a balancing test to 
allow developers and landowners to plan new projects without voiding their titles 
while protecting public interests in water resources.  
Following Massachusetts’ and Wisconsin’s leads, Ohio should consider the 
following factors in determining whether a public trust land use comports with the 
public trust doctrine: 
the purpose and effect of the development;  
the impact on abutters and the surrounding community;  
enhancement to the property;  
the impact on the shoreline as a whole, including the impact on public 
water access; 
whether the development is water dependant or if there are other equally 
suitable locations; 
the degree of public access to the development; and 
the environmental impact of the development. 
Under this test, the following specific examples should meet acceptable trust 
uses: revitalization of underutilized waterfront properties; promotion of regional and 
local commerce, employment, economic development; and community renewal.161 
Any project built upon public trust land should retain the people’s access to water 
resources. For example, the Cleveland Waterfront Plan should include public parks 
or a boardwalk open to the public as an integral part of the development plan. 
Furthermore, Ohio’s public trust doctrine should be applied according to the title 
holder of the land at issue. A more stringent standard should be required when 
applying the public trust to state-owned land and a more lenient standard should be 
applied to privately-owned land. The reasoning for applying distinct scrutiny levels 
is twofold. First, owners holding title to trust land should be able to exercise 
                                                            
 159 See Cleveland Asks Prospective Lakefront Developers to Start Lining Up, 
IDEASTREAM.COM (June 3, 2013), http://www.ideastream.org/news/feature/54072. 
 160 As might be the case if Ohio followed Rhode Island’s lead by extinguishing the public 
trust in privately owned land. 
 161 S. 371, 187th Gen. Court (Mass. 2011), available at http://www.malegislature.gov/Bills/
187/Senate/S00371. 
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discretion with land the state granted to them, subject to public rights. Second, the 
state must knowingly and deliberately grant private owners title to land within the 
public trust. Knowledge that private title holders will enjoy broader uses may 
prevent the state from granting the land initially, providing an incentive to keep the 
shoreline publicly held by the state and ensuring its use to benefit the public. While 
considering the factors listed above, in determining allowable uses for state-owned 
trust land, the main consideration should be whether it serves a public purpose that 
provides a greater public benefit than public detriment and furthers the public’s 
rights.162 This heightened test for publicly owned trust land will serve as an 
additional protection for the lakefront’s shoreline.  
Finally, Ohio should consider extinguishing public trust restrictions from 
landlocked property when it was filled before 1975.163 Regulating land separated for 
years from the very resource sought to be protected is contrary to the doctrine’s 
original intent. Once severed from the water, land use restrictions no longer protect 
the shoreline and waterways, but impede valuable land resources from being 
utilized.164 “Such [landlocked] property is valueless in its present state for trust 
purposes,” and limiting its use no longer benefits the public.165 Applying the public 
trust doctrine to filled land which no longer abuts the water is simply contrary to the 
public trust doctrine’s original intent to protect the nation’s navigable waterways. 
While extinguishing the public trust from all filled land might promote private filling 
and the subsequent destruction water resources, extinguishing it from existing land, 
filled decades ago and no longer retaining its public trust attributes, will not 
significantly impact the public’s rights.  
Cleveland’s Lakefront Development Plan seeks to develop the very land that 
would be impacted by extinguishing the public trust from land filled prior to 1975. 
This would comport with the Ohio legislature’s historical attempt to exclude 
Cleveland’s metropolitan area from the public trust. When the original Fleming Act 
was enacted in 1917, the legislature expressly excluded the area surrounding 
Cleveland, including submerged and filled and near downtown, from the public 
trust.166 The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently found this provision unconstitutional 
because it was not a law of general applicability and repealed the exclusionary 
provision.167 However, enacting this language is evidence that the legislature 
intended to exempt this land from the trust and allow the metropolitan waterfront to 
be developed unhindered. 
The public trust doctrine has a significant impact on developing and revitalizing 
Ohio’s waterfront. The doctrine also undoubtedly has considerable environmental 
                                                            
 162 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 14 (West 2012). 
 163 See also City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 437 (Cal. 1970) (suggesting that 
when filled public trust land is cut off from water access it is no longer useful for trust 
purposes and can be freed from the trust). 
 164 See City of Berkeley v. Super. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 374 (Cal. 1980) (“[W]e believe that in 
balancing the interests at stake, the public right in [landlocked] parcels may be adequately 
protected by our holding that only the tidal portions thereof are subject to the trust.”). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See State ex rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland, 82 N.E.2d 709, 722-23 (Ohio 1948). 
 167 Id. (finding the Fleming Act violated OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26 and art. XIII, § 1). 
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consequences. An overbroad public use requirement may lead to unfettered 
construction to the detriment of Ohio’s natural shoreline. On the other hand, 
imposing overly harsh restrictions on development and land use may lead to the 
shoreline’s ossification, leaving the waterfront a veritable wasteland. Neither 
scenario benefits Ohio’s environment, and the public’s interests demand a balanced 
approach to using and developing the state’s waterfront resources. Some scholars 
have viewed the public trust as a legal vessel for environmental protectionism, 
focusing on the individual's right to freely access and enjoy nature.168 However, 
while the environmental effects of Ohio’s public trust doctrine are no doubt far 
reaching, this topic is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the doctrine 
within the context of Cleveland’s Lakefront Development Plan.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Waterfront redevelopment has significant potential to assist cities, including 
Cleveland, in revitalizing urban areas. This reinvestment in crucial waterfront 
neighborhoods will benefit the very people the public trust doctrine was created to 
protect by preventing the ossification of Ohio’s invaluable shoreline. Ohio must 
adopt a clear public trust doctrine to facilitate the highest and best use of its valuable 
land and water resources by clearing up murky titles and ephemeral use restrictions 
that hinder the land’s development.  
                                                            
 168 See generally Sax, supra note 10. 
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